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Abstract
We investigate how the selection process of a leader aﬀects team performance
with respect to social learning. We use a lab experiment in which an incentivized
guessing task is repeated in a star network with the leader at the center. Leader se-
lection is either based on competence, on self-conﬁdence, or made at random. Teams
with random leaders do not underperform compared to rather competent leaders,
and they even outperform teams whose leader is selected based on self-conﬁdence.
The reason is that random leaders are better able to use the knowledge within the
team, i.e., the wisdom of crowds. We can show that it is the declaration of the
selection procedure which makes non-random leaders overly inﬂuential. The central
position in the communication network already makes a leader highly inﬂuential.
Knowing that the leader is not selected at random pushes team members to weigh
the leader’s opinion even more. We set up a horse race between several rational
and na¨ıve models of social learning to investigate the micro-level mechanisms. We
ﬁnd that overconﬁdence and conservatism contribute to the fact that too conﬁdent
leaders mislead their team in ﬁnding good estimates.
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1 Introduction
In our rapidly changing world, most modern organizations are embedded in highly dy-
namic environments. For the management of an organization, the ﬁrst essential step to
successful decision-making is the basic task of obtaining an accurate view of the envi-
ronment.1 For instance, this can be the foundation for deﬁning a mission statement, as
argued, e.g., in Bolton et al. (2013). Recently, there have been a number of contributions
showing that organizations can improve their decision-making upon using the expertise of
a single individual by harnessing the wisdom of crowds (e.g., Surowiecki (2004); Mannes
(2009); Keuschnigg and Ganser (2017)). However, this literature has not analyzed whether
a team’s ability to learn from each other depends on characteristics of the team leader.
Given the initial level of information of each team member, the accuracy of the up-
dated opinions depends on the social learning process within the team. Many teams are
organized such that one person, the team leader, directly communicates with each team
member while the other members often communicate only indirectly with each other –
via the team leader. In this paper, we address the question of how the selection of the
team leader aﬀects the performance of social learning in the team. Is it necessary that
the central person is the one with the highest expertise? How do personality traits, such
as self-conﬁdence (in the own expertise), aﬀect the process of social learning? Should the
selection criterion be declared or rather hidden? Answering these questions is important
for the design of successful organizations.
To address these questions, we set up a lab experiment in which subjects are asked
to answer incentivized estimation questions repeatedly. After each round, subjects can
observe the guesses and the conﬁdence levels of some of their team members according to a
star network with the leader at the center. Thus, every team member observes the guesses
of the leader, while only the leader observes the guesses of all members. We randomly
allocate subjects into three treatments, which diﬀer by the criterion that determines how
the team leader is selected. In the baseline treatment (T0), the leader, i.e., the center,
is selected at random. In the accuracy treatment (T1), the leader is the group member
whose estimation of a related question was the most accurate in the team. Finally, in the
conﬁdence treatment (T2), the team member with the highest stated level of conﬁdence
(in the own answer of a related question) is selected. Potential ties in maximal accuracy
or maximal conﬁdence are broken at random.
Interestingly, a set of theoretical models following from the Bayesian approach to
social learning predict for this setting that the selection of the center does not matter
for the outcome, apart from the ﬁrst two rounds, and that social learning is eﬃcient.2
1Indeed, disastrous decisions can often be traced back to management teams whose members are in
disagreement, or – what is arguably even worse – who unintendedly agree on a distorted view of reality.
2For instance, Gale and Kariv (2003), Mueller-Frank (2013), and Rosenberg et al. (2009) provide
frameworks to study social learning among rational agents who are Bayesian updaters.
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The reason is that agents can exchange (“communicate”) their opinions such that proper
aggregation leads to a common estimate (consensus) that is independent of who is at
the center of the communication network. In contrast, a set of models of na¨ıve social
learning predict a strong impact of the center on the same process, which induces an
ineﬃcient outcome.3 Based on the assumption that subjects fail to account correctly for
the repetition of the center’s and the others’ initial opinion, they predict that consensus
is approached over time, but with a strong “bias” towards the center’s initial opinion. In
particular, the center’s weight on the consensus opinion is predicted to be proportional to
her eigenvector centrality, which is several times larger than the other team members’, in
standard speciﬁcations of a na¨ıve model of social learning. Unless the leader is much better
infomed than the other team members, this is suboptimal, giving the leader’s opinion too
much weight. Now, any leader characteristic that further ampliﬁes the weight of the
leader’s opinion undermines performance. As such we study the leader’s self-conﬁdence,
as well as the declaration of why the leader was selected.
Results. In the experiment, we assess performance by the proximity of a guess to the
correct answer. In particular, we measure the individual and the collective errors of
the team’s guesses, and use a measure of the wisdom of the crowds. Our ﬁrst result is
that leader selection based on accuracy (T1) need not outperform the random selection
(T0), while leader selection based on conﬁdence (T2) even undermines performance. The
reason for this surprising result becomes apparent when isolating the eﬀect of declaring
how the leader is selected. The declaration of the leader as somewhat superior, be it in
terms of past performance (T1) or of conﬁdence (T2), induces the other team members
to put more weight on the leader’s opinion, making the team vulnerable to be misled
by a single person. In contrast, teams with random leaders more equally weight each
other’s opinions with the consequence of a higher performance. On top of these eﬀects,
we assess how team performance is aﬀected by (judgmental) overconﬁdence, which is the
tendency to provide too narrow conﬁdence intervals for one’s estimates (e.g., Soll and
Klayman (2004); Moore and Healy (2008); Herz et al. (2014)). It turns out that both
over-conﬁdent leaders and over-conﬁdent other team members undermine performance,
while over-conﬁdent leaders are worse. Hence, when designing a procedure for leader
selection in a situation in which social learning is important, declared random selection
is a viable option and overconﬁdence should be avoided.
In the second part of the paper, we set up a horse race between diﬀerent models of
social learning to shed more light on individual learning behavior and on the mechanisms
of how leader selection aﬀects the wisdom of crowds in networks. Despite a long tradition
of theoretical insights and a growing body of empirical research, social learning behavior
3For instance, DeGroot (1974), Friedkin and Johnsen (1990), DeMarzo et al. (2003), Golub and
Jackson (2010), and Acemoglu et al. (2010) study social learning among na¨ıve agents.
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is still far from being fully understood. In line with the previous literature, we observe
that simple models (of na¨ıve social learning) generally ﬁt better than sophisticated mod-
els (of Bayesian social learning). This has the consequence that the leader’s weight on
the long-term opinion is large already due to her central position in the network struc-
ture. Moreover, the experimental data reveal that an important pattern is missing in
both theoretical approaches: People tend to adapt their opinion less than predicted, a
pattern called conservatism. Conservatism is a very common ﬁnding in experiments on
belief updating and can be caused by (judgmental) overconﬁdence, as we show in this pa-
per.4 We incorporate this feature, which is missing in the theoretical literature on social
learning, into both model classes and observe that incorporating conservatism improves
the model ﬁt of both model classes. Hence, there is important feedback from our data
to theory development. Incorporating conservatism is not only a behavioral twist that
matches empirical ﬁndings, but it also gives an additional reason for why overconﬁdent
leaders undermine performance.
Methodological Approach. In laboratory experiments (and in lab in the ﬁeld exper-
iments), theoretical models can be directly tested. For instance, Corazzini et al. (2012),
Grimm and Mengel (2016), and Chandrasekhar et al. (2016) compare sophisticated mod-
els of Bayesian learning with simple models of na¨ıve learning in settings in which their
predictions diverge. The common conclusion is that the observations are more often con-
sistent with the simple models. Similarly, Choi et al. (2005), C¸elen and Kariv (2005), and
C¸elen et al. (2010) study predictions of social learning models experimentally. A caveat of
this theory-testing approach is that the participants are confronted with highly stylized
tasks such as guessing an average (or its sign) of randomly drawn numbers (Corazzini
et al., 2012; C¸elen and Kariv, 2005; C¸elen et al., 2010) or ﬁnding an abstract true state
(Choi et al., 2005; Grimm and Mengel, 2016; Chandrasekhar et al., 2016). It is question-
able how the investigated learning behavior transfers to settings with real questions. A
lab in the ﬁeld approach (Chandrasekhar et al., 2016) does not fully mitigate this issue
of external validity, because the types of questions are still often stylized. At the other
side of the spectrum, real teams could be studied in the ﬁeld to address our main research
question (without the issue of external validity). However, besides the issues of noise,
missing values, and the problem to measure performance of social learning, there would
be a severe endogeneity problem. First, because face-to-face interaction gives rise to ef-
fects (e.g., due to charisma), which are diﬃcult to control for, and second, because there is
usually no proper randomization on who becomes a leader. For these reasons, we decided
4Experiments on belief updating frequently ﬁnd that real people are more conservative updaters than
the theoretical model would predict (Mobius et al., 2011; Ambuehl and Li, 2014; Mannes and Moore,
2013), a pattern that has already been summarized in a classic survey (Peterson and Beach, 1967):
“when statistical man and subjects start with the same prior probabilities for two population proportions,
subjects revise their probabilities in the same direction but not as much as statistical man does[.]”
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to use some middle ground between these two approaches (theory-testing experiment and
ﬁeld data) in order to complement them. For that purpose, we imported a method devel-
oped outside of economics which has been increasingly used recently (Lorenz et al., 2011;
Rauhut and Lorenz, 2011). Participants are asked to answer knowledge questions about
vaguely known facts for which the true answer is known (and could in principle easily
be looked up, e.g., on Wikipedia.com). The questions cover various topics and create
a natural uncertainty among the participants who are paid according to their answers’
accuracy. Arguably, teams who are able to estimate such factual questions accurately are
also better at estimating states that cannot be simply measured, or at estimating future
states of the world (which is of high relevance in real managerial or political teams). In
our experiment, however, the quality of social learning can be assessed without waiting
for the future to realize. The realism of that approach already changes the way subjects
communicate with each other because, given that there is no stylized draw of signals which
is common knowledge, it becomes important not only to communicate the guess, but also
the own conﬁdence in the guess. We consider it as a realistic assumption that people can
“tag” the pieces of information they pass on with a conﬁdence level by stating how conﬁ-
dent they feel about their own guess.5 This aspect is missing in most other experiments
of social learning because it is simply not necessary to communicate conﬁdence if signal
quality is artiﬁcially made common knowledge.
Contribution. Our paper entails three contributions. First, we provide empirical ev-
idence for the superiority of a selection procedure that is based on random leader se-
lection (“sortition”). For both corporate and political governance, sortition (also called
demarchy, allotment, or aleatory democracy) is discussed as an alternative selection pro-
cedure, which has its roots in ancient Athens and medieval Italy (Zeitoun et al., 2014;
Frey and Osterloh, 2016). Despite of a long list of claimed advantages of this procedure,
empirical evidence showing its superiority is very rare. One exception is the study by
Haslam et al. (1998), which shows experimentally that randomly selected leaders can en-
hance team performance in a task of deciding upon priorities in a hypothetical survival
situation (e.g., after a plane crash). The mechanism behind the eﬀect, however, remains
largely unclear.6 Our results not only show that random selection can be beneﬁcial com-
pared to selection based on conﬁdence, but also demonstrate that it is the declaration of
randomness rather than the selection at random per se that is the crucial aspect. The
strength of random selection is based on the fact that the leader’s inﬂuence on team
members is not ampliﬁed by declaring the leader’s specialty. Since the leader is already
5This is similar to the literature that considers “tagging” pieces of information with their source
(Acemoglu et al., 2014; Phan et al., 2015).
6Interestingly, they also observe that randomly selected leaders are, despite their superior performance,
often perceived by their team members as less eﬀective than formally selected leaders.
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special because of her network position, additionally highlighting the leader’s properties
by declaring them to be relevant for selecting the leader makes the others disrespect their
own opinions, which results in a loss, because the wisdom of crowds is not harnessed.
Second, our experimental data reveal that the extent of (judgmental) overconﬁdence,
i.e., providing too narrow conﬁdence intervals, has a strong deteriorating eﬀect on team
performance. Indeed, overconﬁdent team members undermine performance, and over-
conﬁdent team leaders have an even stronger deteriorating eﬀect. For the selection of
leaders within organizations, this suggests that either over-conﬁdent leaders should be
generally avoided or that there is at least a trade-oﬀ between beneﬁcial eﬀects of a leader’s
overconﬁdence (e.g., to foster coordination (Bolton et al., 2013) or to motivate team mem-
bers (Gervais and Goldstein, 2007)) and the negative eﬀect on social learning. Judgmental
overconﬁdence is a personality trait that can easily be assessed, e.g., in an assessment cen-
ter in the course of a selection procedure.
Third and ﬁnally, our paper makes a methodological contribution. By combining the
experiments on factual questions with the theories on social learning, we bridge between
neat theoretical frameworks and experimental set-ups that are less stylized (than those
used for pure theory testing). By building this bridge it becomes apparent that the
assumption of common knowledge about signal precision is problematic. Arguably, in
reality people do not know the signal precision of their interaction partners, but form
expectations about it, given what they know about this person and given how this person
“tagged” her piece of information with a level of conﬁdence. (Judgmental) overconﬁdence,
as well as mistrust or anchoring eﬀects, can lead to conservatism in updating, i.e., agents
incorporate new pieces of information less than theoretically predicted. Bolton et al.
(2013) further argue that other behavioral biases such as a selection bias in information
acquisition can also induce conservatism (what they call resoluteness). We incorporate
this idea into both na¨ıve and rational models of social learning and ﬁnd that the model
ﬁt of each model increases. This is informative for economic theory on na¨ıve and rational
social learning by opening a fruitful avenue for an empirically important model extension.
In particular, our simple extensions of the models alter the prediction that consensus
is reached or approached. Instead, they predict a persisting diversity of opinions, in
which each agent’s long-run opinion is “biased” in the direction of his initial opinion.
This qualitatively diﬀerent prediction could be studied more generally and be tested in
follow-up experiments.
2 Experimental Design
In a nutshell, participants in this experiment were asked to answer the same knowledge
questions multiple times. The team leader could observe the previous answers of all team
members, while the team members could only observe the previous answer of the team
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leader. Treatments diﬀered by the selection criterion that determined the team leader.
The experiment was conducted at the University of Hamburg and consisted of eleven
sessions with a total of 176 subjects.7 In each session, participants were randomly allo-
cated into groups of four. The basic task was to answer a factual question individually
and to provide a level of conﬁdence for the answer. The closer the estimate was to the
correct answer, the more it was honored by game points which were translated into actual
payouts, as detailed in Table C.4. On average, sessions lasted for one hour and partici-
pants earned 9.50 Euros, which was close to the norm of the lab. The maximum feasible
payout was 48.20, while the minimum was the show-up fee of 5 Euros. This fact was ex-
plicitly stated to the participants in order to highlight that the payout strongly depended
on individual performance. It was pointed out verbally and in the written instructions
that the use of mobile phones, smart phones, tablets, or similar devices would lead to
expulsion from the experiment and exclusion from all payments.
Each session consisted of two phases: A selection phase I and a decision phase II. In
the selection phase I, each participant answered eight diﬀerent factual questions once. At
the end of the experiment, one of these questions was randomly selected to be payoﬀ-
relevant. In the decision phase II, there was another set of eight questions, each of which
was similar to one of the questions of the selection phase. For instance, there was a
question about voter turnout in both phases of the experiment. Similarly, there were two
questions about the share of water in certain vegetables. Questions related to diverse
topics and each question was already tested in previous experiments (Lorenz et al., 2011;
Rauhut and Lorenz, 2011; Moussa¨ıd et al., 2013).8
In the decision phase II, each question had to be answered six times, once in each
round. After each round, participants received feedback about the answers and conﬁdence
statements provided by their group members according to a star network. The center of
the star network could observe the previous answers and conﬁdence levels of all four team
members; the three pendants could only observe the previous answer and conﬁdence of
the center, in addition to their own. For each question of phase II, only one of the six
rounds was selected at random by the end of the session to be payoﬀ-relevant. Hence,
there was no possibility to “hedge” risk with a portfolio of answers.
The actual treatments diﬀered by the procedure that determined who within a group
of four became the center of the star network for phase II. In the baseline treatment T0,
the center was selected at random. In the accuracy treatment T1, the center became the
group member whose guess on the similar question in phase I was closest to the correct
answer. In the conﬁdence treatment T2, the center became the group member whose level
of conﬁdence for the guess on the similar question in phase I was highest. Potential ties
in accuracy or conﬁdence were broken at random. Half of all groups played the random
7A more detailed description of the experimental procedures can be found in Appendix C.
8The full list of questions can be found in Appendix C.
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treatment (T0) for four questions and the accuracy treatment (T1) for the other four
questions; the other half played the random treatment (T0) for four questions and the
conﬁdence treatment (T2) for four questions. When the network for one question was
formed, the selection procedure was made transparent to the group members. In the
selection phase I, subjects did not know how decisions in the selection phase could have
an inﬂuence on the decision phase. Instructions for the ﬁrst phase simply announced that
there would be a second phase with another set of instructions. This precluded strategic
behavior in phase I, e.g., to become the center or to avoid becoming the center in phase II.
While the answers to the questions were strongly incentivized, the conﬁdence statements
were not directly incentivized. Hence, the statements of conﬁdence in phase II can also
be considered as a mere communication technology. As we discuss in the next section,
among rational agents there are indeed incentives to communicate truthfully the level of
conﬁdence in our setting in order to foster optimal learning in the group. However, our
experimental results will not rely on the assumption that the conﬁdence statements are
truthful.
3 Theoretical Background
In this section, we derive theoretical predictions about the behavior in our experiment.
The set-up is as follows. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} be the agents in one team. Let 1 be the
center of the star network and 2, 3, 4 the pendants. The basic task in our experiment is
to provide guesses on a speciﬁc question, the answer of which is a fraction. There is an
unkown state of the world θ ∈ Θ, which is the correct answer to the question at hand.9
Denote by xi(t) the answer of agent i at time t. Denote by ci(t) the conﬁdence statement
of agent i at time t. Time is discrete: t = 1, 2, ..., T , with T = 6 in phase II of the
experiment. Accurate guesses are incentivized by a payoﬀ function π(ei(t)) that is weakly
decreasing in the distance to the true answer ei(t) = |θ − xi(t)|. One out of six answers
is ﬁnally drawn as payoﬀ-relevant.
To make predictions about the participants’ guesses in phase II, we use two approaches:
a rational learning approach and a na¨ıve learning approach.
3.1 Rational Learning Approach: Bayesian Updating
In the rational learning approach, we assume that agents maximize expected payoﬀs given
their beliefs and that beliefs are formed by Bayes rule.
Notice that a belief about the true answer is not a single number, but a probability
distribution over the possible states (fi(t) : Θ → R). In the ﬁrst round of guessing,
9In the experiment, the correct answer is rounded and belongs to the ﬁnite set Θ =
{0, 0.01, 0, 02, ..., 0.99, 1}, which we can also model as the interval Θ = [0, 1].
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t = 1, agents are endowed with some private information, i.e., what they know about
the question at hand before interacting in the team. In the second round, each pendant
i = 1 has observed the guess x1(1) and the conﬁdence statement c1(1) of the center and
can use this to update his belief. The center, on the other hand, has observed all guesses
and conﬁdence levels of the ﬁrst round to form her belief, which is the basis for her
second-round guess x1(2). If we assume that the guess and conﬁdence level are suﬃcient
to reconstruct an agent’s belief and that the agents know how their private information
is interrelated, then the center is fully informed after the ﬁrst round of guesses. In this
case, she can make the optimal guess x∗ := argmaxx∈ΘE[π(|θ−x|)|f1(1), ..., f4(1)], given
the pieces of information in the team. Since all agents have the same payoﬀ function
and pendants can observe the center’s guess x1(2) = x
∗, all agents make the same guess
xi(t) = x
∗ from round 3 on. This observation leads to the following prediction.10
Prediction 1 (Bayes). In a model with common knowledge of rationality and common
priors, the following holds. If the answer and conﬁdence statement of a linked team
member in a star network is suﬃcient fully to represent her private information, then
the center learns once and the pendants learn twice. (Learning refers here to information
updates and improvements in expectations.) Moreover, all team members will state the
optimal answer x∗ in any round t ≥ 3, independent of who is at the center of the star
network.
Prediction 1 states that the selection of the team leader does not matter for the per-
formance of social learning, apart from the ﬁrst two rounds (and, in fact, only apart from
round two). Moreover, it states that every agent states the payoﬀ-maximizing guess, which
implies that social learning is “eﬃcient” in the sense of maximizing the sum of expected
payoﬀs. However, several of its underlying assumptions deserve further attention.
First, a rational agent i is assumed to state the answer xi(t) that maximizes expected
payoﬀ, given his belief. This holds at least in the last round t = 6. In earlier rounds, there
is potentially a strategic incentive to provide an answer that does not maximize expected
payoﬀ of that round (in order to be able to provide a better answer in later rounds). In
fact, the earliest possibility to realize a deviating strategy is to deviate in round t = 1,
learn something about the reaction of others in round t = 2, and materialize the better
guess in round t ≥ 3. Since, under the assumptions above, each agent states the optimal
answer from round t = 3 on, strategic misrepresentation cannot pay oﬀ. There is simply
no room for improvement. The same argument applies to the strategic misrepresentation
of conﬁdence statements. Hence, strategic misrepresentation is not an issue in our setting.
Second, it is explicitly assumed that statements of guesses and conﬁdence levels are
suﬃcient to recover beliefs. For this to be satisﬁed, the agent must know the other’s
10A formal statement of this result can be found in the Online Appendix B. There we introduce the
general framework (B.1.1), prove the proposition (B.1.2), and provide two speciﬁc examples how such a
rational model unfolds in our setting (B.2.1).
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belief up to one or two parameters. This is satisﬁed, for instance, in models assuming
that beliefs follow a beta distribution.11 Bayesian models with weaker assumptions could
assume that agents also have beliefs about the signal quality of the others and imperfectly
learn over time both the available private signals as well as their quality. Given the result
by Aumann (1976), such a model is expected to lead to more learning iterations, but to
the same outcome in the long run.
Third, how exactly an agent updates depends on his higher order beliefs on how private
pieces of information are related to each other and how they are related to the truth. In
theoretical models, it is usually assumed that there is common knowledge about the prior
distribution of the true state, and about how private signals are drawn. In this experiment,
agents are confronted with real questions. Hence, the agents’ higher order beliefs about
their own and their fellow team members’ expertise can also depend on additional factors,
such as the particular question at hand or on the treatment. In particular, the accuracy
treatment T1, i.e., that the center gave the most accurate answer to a similar question,
or the conﬁdence treatment T2, i.e., that the center was the most conﬁdent on a similar
question, might reveal something about the agent’s ability that could be considered in
the updating process. If anything, the declaration of the treatment T1 or T2 can reveal
additional information, which would lead to better guesses, compared to the random
treatment T0. To generate a prediction that is much more in line with the theoretical
models, Prediction 1 abstracts from this possibility by assuming that there is common
knowledge about how the private pieces of information are related to each other and to
the truth.12
Fourth and ﬁnally, the assumption of common knowledge of rationality need not be
satisﬁed. In sum, it cannot be expected that the requirements of Prediction 1 above
are fully satisﬁed in the experiment. Still, the Prediction 1 gives us a clean baseline to
compare the data with.
3.2 Na¨ıve Learning Approach: DeGroot Model
Previous experimental research on social learning has not always found strong support
for Bayesian learning, but often suggests that simple rules of updating, such as repeat-
edly taking averages, ﬁt the data well (Corazzini et al., 2012; Grimm and Mengel, 2016;
Battiston and Stanca, 2014; Chandrasekhar et al., 2016). We use their common mod-
eling approach, which is often named after Morris DeGroot, to generate an alternative
prediction and to later specify models of more na¨ıve learning. The basic aspect of na¨ıvete´
incorporated in this modeling approach is that agents do not suﬃciently account for the
11We study such models in Section B.2.1.
12In the experiment, we did not induce a common prior because we used questions of real topics.
Nevertheless, we argue that models that assume a common prior and signals can contribute to our
understanding of social learning in real settings.
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origin of information such that pieces of information are used each time they reach an
agent through the network. This behavioral bias is also called “persuasion bias” (DeMarzo
et al., 2003).
In the DeGroot model, the way people average the former guesses in their network
neighborhood is typically constant. In the star network, this means that peripheral agents
always provide a guess that is a mixture between the center’s and their own last guess,
with constant weights gi1 and gii on the two, while the center mixes all answers with some
constant weights g11, g12, g13, g14, which are also positive and sum up to one. Given the
weights and the initial answers xi(1), all consecutive answers xi(t) are fully determined.
In particular, if G denotes the (row-stochastic) 4 × 4 matrix consisting of these entries
gij and zeros at the remaining entries, the agents’ updating can be written in vector and
matrix notation as x(t) = Gx(t−1). Hence, the predicted guesses are x(t) = Gt−1x(1), for
t = 1, 2, .... Each agent thus generically changes guesses from round to round. Assuming
that averaging weights are strictly positive is suﬃcient for the conclusion that all agent’s
guesses xi(t) converge for t → ∞ to the same answer, which we denote by xi(∞). Given
that convergence is fast enough, xi(∞) is also a good prediction for xi(6). It can be shown
that, for any i,
xi(∞) = 1
c
(
1x1(1) +
g12
g21
x2(1) +
g13
g31
x3(1) +
g14
g41
x4(1)
)
, (1)
with c = 1+ g12
g21
+ g13
g31
+ g14
g41
. The weights wi =
1
c
· g1i
gi1
measure long-term inﬂuence of an agent
i, which is called eigenvector centrality in network science since w′G = w′ (e.g., Friedkin
1991, DeMarzo et al. 2003, Golub and Jackson 2010). As can be directly observed from
Equation 1, the center’s inﬂuence on the long-term answer is diﬀerent from a pendant
i’s inﬂuence, as long as g1i
gi1
= 1. In particular, the center has a stronger inﬂuence if the
center’s weight on the pendant g1i is lower than the pendant’s weight on the center gi1.
This is a realistic assumption since pendants have only the center’s guess to update from,
while the center can distribute her weight among three pendants.
To discuss performance of social learning in this model type, we need to make as-
sumptions about the relation between the initial guesses xi(1) and the truth θ, e.g., that
initial guesses are realizations of independent random variables that have the truth as
expected values. For any such probabilistic model and for any deﬁnition of the “optimal”
guess xˆ given the initial guesses, the approached value x(∞) and the optimal guess xˆ will
only coincide if by coincidence the averaging weights happen to be optimal in that sense.
The same holds true for the guesses and optimal guesses of early rounds, say round two.
Even if the weights gij happen to produce the optimal guess xˆ for some agent i in some
round t, they will not have this property for every agent and for every round. Hence,
there is an inherent ineﬃciency in these na¨ıve models of social learning. The reason is
that initial guesses of some participants are incorporated in the change of answers more
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frequently than other team members’ guesses, while guessing weights are constant. These
observations lead to the following prediction.13
Prediction 2 (DeGroot). In the na¨ıve model with constant and positive averaging weights,
the following holds. In a star network, every agent’s learning heavily depends on the
network structure, i.e., on who is the center. In particular, for gi1 > g1i, the center has
a larger inﬂuence on the long-run opinion than team member i. Generically, the center
updates more than once and the pendants update more than twice. Under weak conditions,
the ﬁrst round of updating is learning (the expected error decreases), but for every notion
of what is the optimal answer, the team members will generally state suboptimal answers.
Prediction 2 states that the selection of the team leader heavily aﬀects the perfor-
mance of social learning, and that social learning is generally “ineﬃcient” in the sense of
not maximizing any function that is decreasing in the error of an agent’s guess. Given
the weighting matrix G, the na¨ıve model is fully speciﬁed and provides a clear-cut pre-
diction about all agents’ guesses in all rounds. Typical speciﬁcations of G are studied in
Section 5.3.
Our treatments T1 and T2 mainly aﬀect na¨ıve social learning through the manipu-
lation of the network structure (who is at the center), but potentially also through the
declaration of the treatments. The second channel would be present if the averaging
weights gij depended on this declaration. In the empirical analysis, we will disentangle
the eﬀects of the manipulation of the center – which does not matter according to Pre-
diction 1, but is crucial according to Prediction 2 – from potential eﬀects of declaration
(which can only be helpful in the rational framework of Prediction 1, but could also be
harmful in the na¨ıve framework of Prediction 2).
4 Success of Social Learning
The two theoretical approaches lead to contradicting predictions. Therefore, it remains
an empirical question whether and how the selection of the leader aﬀects the success of
social learning.
4.1 Performance over Time
We measure the quality of the ﬁnal answers both on the individual and on the collective
level. On the individual level, we measure the quality by the error ei(t), which is the
absolute distance between answer xi(t) and truth θ. On the group level, we use two com-
plementary measures. First, we measure the quality of the four answers by the collective
13A formal statement of this result can be found in in the Online Appendix B.1.3. There we introduce
a probabilistic framework and prove the proposition.
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error, i.e., the error of the mean of the four answers in the group ce(t) = |1
4
∑4
i=1 xi(t)−θ|.
Indeed, given the four ﬁnal answers by a group, a decision might be taken on the basis
of the mean of the four answers. Second, we consider whether the correct answer lies
within the interval that is spanned by the four answers, and if so, whether it also lies
within the interval that is spanned by the two answers which are contained in the interval
of the two other answers. We deﬁne the indicator variable (wisdom of) crowd error as
follows: woce(t) = 0 if at most two answers are strictly below or strictly above the cor-
rect answer; woce(t) = 1 if three answers are strictly below or strictly above the correct
answer; and woce(t) = 2 if the correct answer lies strictly above or below all four answers
in the group. The crowd error measures the error made when assuming that the correct
answer lies between the given answers. For all three measures of performance, smaller
errors mean higher performance.
Figure 1 depicts the levels of these performance measures over time, distinguishing
by the three treatments. Panels A-C show that the individual errors are on average
between 10 and 20 percentage points from the true answer and tend to decrease over
time. More precisely, the pendants’ average error reduces three times signiﬁcantly on
the ﬁve percent level. As intended in the accuracy treatment T1, selecting a center who
was most accurate in answering a similar question (in phase I) leads to centers who are
signiﬁcantly better in estimating the current question in the ﬁrst round (of phase II).
The centers’ average error reduces signiﬁcantly once in the random treatment T0, as
well as in the conﬁdence treatment T2, but never so in the accuracy treatment T1 (at
signiﬁcance levels p < 0.05). By and large, these observations on the learning dynamics
are consistent with the predictions of the rational model, namely that pendants learn
twice and centers learn once. In particular, in the random treatment T0 the center
reduces her error drastically from the ﬁrst round to the second without signiﬁcant further
improvements, as the rational model would predict. Panels D-F show that the collective
errors are on average between 12 and 16 percentage points from the true answer and also
reduce over time. Similarly to the individual errors, the collective errors ﬁrst decrease and
then seem to settle after a few rounds (at a point that is signiﬁcantly greater than zero).
Taking these observations on individual and collective errors together, agents do learn
from each other, but most of learning takes place in the ﬁrst and in the second round
of updating, i.e., until round t = 3.14 A similar pattern, albeit with a change of sign,
can be observed in panels G-I for the crowd error: The crowd error increases over time
with most of its changes until round t = 3. This observation is consistent with ﬁndings
of Lorenz et al. (2011), who show that the exchange of opinions reduces the wisdom of
14Learning cannot stem from having more time to think about a question since participants of the
experiment who are not confronted with any information about the guesses and conﬁdence of others did
not at all improve over time. We tested this possibility with participants of the experimental sessions
who were not exposed to any information. We randomly selected these subjects from all participants of
sessions whose number of participants was not divisible by four, the size of our groups.
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crowds. Crowd error is an indicator variable of which the averages have to be interpreted
correspondingly. For instance, in the random treatment T0, woce(6) is 1.57 on average,
which indicates that there are many cases (here: 65.9%) with a crowd error of two, and
very few cases (8.5%) with a crowd error of zero. Hence, in the ﬁnal period the correct
answer most frequently lies outside of the convex hull of the provided answers.
Result 1. Individual and collective errors reduce over time. Centers learn once (except
in the accuracy treatment T1); pendants learn at least twice. Crowd errors increase over
time.
4.2 Treatment Eﬀects on Performance
To test for treatment eﬀects, we run regressions with the three error measures as the
dependent variables and with treatment dummies as the independent variables. We focus
our analysis on investigating the eﬀects of learning on the ﬁnal period, which is period 6.
The last period is the most relevant, since it is the last period up to which learning can take
place. In consecutive robustness analyses, we also analyze performance for earlier rounds
back to period t = 3, the ﬁrst round in which full learning can theoretically take place.
Notice that the distribution of (individual and collective) errors is heavily skewed, similar
to an income distribution. Taking the logarithm (e.g., log(ei(t) + 1)) in the regressions
of individual and collective errors gives less weight to errors which are far away from the
truth and more weight to errors close to the true answer, such that the analysis will not
be driven by a few cases in which errors were huge, say, forty and more. For the variable
crowd error, which may attain values 0, 1, and 2, we use ordered logit.
Table 1 reports these models when controlling for each treatment T1 and T2 with
a dummy variable, while T0 is the reference category. We control for the heterogeneity
between diﬀerent questions by using dummy variables. If selecting the most accurate or
the most competent enhances performance, then we should see a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect
on the three errors. As Table 1 reveals, the accuracy treatment T1 does not outperform
the random treatment T0. The coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant and even positive. Even
more strikingly, the conﬁdence treatment T2 underperforms compared with the random
treatment T0. The latter eﬀect is signiﬁcant on the 5-percent level for the individual error
and the crowd error, and signiﬁcant on the 10-percent level for the collective error.
Result 2. Performance does not improve when the center is known to be the most accurate
(T1). Performance even deteriorates when the center is known to be the most conﬁdent
(T2).
To understand the mechanism behind these treatment eﬀects of selecting the most
accurate or the most conﬁdent agent as a center, we distinguish between two aspects of
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Figure 1: Individual, collective, and crowd errors over time by treatments. Panels A, B,
C diﬀerentiate between centers (black) and pendants (gray). All conﬁdence intervals are
standard 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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(1) (2) (3)
individual error (log) collective error (log) crowd error
accuracy treatment (T1) 0.026 0.003 0.106
(0.49) (0.03) (0.40)
conﬁdence treatment (T2) 0.144∗ 0.179 0.739∗
(2.44) (1.80) (2.39)
intercept 2.164∗∗∗ 2.149∗∗∗
(33.40) (17.77)
intercept cut 1 -2.555∗∗∗
(-6.76)
intercept cut 2 -0.830∗
(-2.51)
N 1.408 352 352
t statistics in parentheses
Question dummy coeﬃcients for 8 questions not shown
Individual error: robust s.e. clustered for 176 subjects
Collective and crowd errors: robust s.e. clustered for 44 groups
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1: Treatment eﬀects on ﬁnal errors: log error, log collective error, and wisdom of
crowd error (in period 6). Linear regression (models 1 and 2) and ordered logit regression
(model 3).
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each treatment, the trait of the central agent and the declaration of how the central agent
was selected. By our experimental design we can disentangle the two eﬀects, since in the
random treatment T0 it frequently happens by chance that the most accurate agent was
selected as the center without having the declaration of her or his accuracy, as is the case
in the T1 treatment. The same applies for conﬁdence; in a number of cases, the most
conﬁdent agent was randomly selected to be the center in the random treatment T0.
Table 2 reports the results of the regressions when we control for the trait that the
center is the most accurate or the most conﬁdent in the group, such that the treatment
dummies only pick up the declaration eﬀect. When the center happens to be the most
conﬁdent or the most accurate, the outcome measures tend to improve, which can be seen
from the negative sign of the coeﬃcient. When the conﬁdence of the center is declared
to all group members, however, the performance is reduced. The results are qualitatively
similar for accuracy of the center in the sense that the signs of the eﬀects are the same,
but we cannot reject the null in that case, and the size of the eﬀects is also smaller than
for conﬁdence.
While Table 2 reports the eﬀects for the ﬁnal period after all learning has taken place,
Figure 2 illustrates robustness analyses of declaration eﬀects when the regressions are run
for each period separately. We show periods 3 to 6, since these are the periods after which
full learning could happen and did take place according to the error dynamics (Figure 1).
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Figure 2: Treatment eﬀects on errors: log error, log collective error, and wisdom of crowd
error (periods 3-6). Linear regressions, 95 % conﬁdence intervals.
The eﬀect of declaring that the center is the most conﬁdent consistently increases the
error measures and thus reduces performance. The declaration of accuracy has the same
tendency, but the eﬀects are smaller and insigniﬁcant.
Result 3. Performance tends to improve when the center is the most conﬁdent. Decla-
ration of conﬁdence undermines performance.
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(1) (2) (3)
individual error (log) collective error (log) crowd error
accuracy-trait -0.110 -0.0716 -0.0477
(-1.88) (-0.76) (-0.15)
accuracy-declaration (T1) 0.117 0.0790 0.196
(1.64) (0.60) (0.57)
conﬁdence-trait -0.106 -0.231∗ -0.474
(-1.95) (-2.20) (-1.74)
conﬁdence-declaration (T2) 0.218∗∗ 0.335∗ 1.053∗∗
(3.17) (2.58) (2.79)
intercept 2.221∗∗∗ 2.241∗∗∗
(34.17) (20.06)
intercept cut 1 -2.735∗∗∗
(-6.99)
intercept cut 2 -0.999∗∗
(-2.89)
N 1.408 352 352
t statistics in parentheses
Question dummy coeﬃcients for 8 questions not shown
Individual error: robust s.e. clustered for 176 subjects
Collective and crowd errors: robust s.e. clustered for 44 groups
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2: Treatment eﬀects on ﬁnal errors: log error, log collective error, and wisdom of
crowd error (in period 6). Linear regression (models 1 and 2) and ordered logit (model
3).
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4.3 Social Inﬂuence
To analyze why the selection of the center can have a negative impact on performance,
we study to which extent agents within a group inﬂuence each other. For this purpose
we regress the answer xi(t) of an agent i in time t ≥ 3 on his initial answer xi(1), as well
as on the initial answers of the other group members xj(1). In particular, a pendant’s
answer is regressed on the center’s initial answer, his own initial answer, and the mean of
the other two pendants’ initial answers. The center’s answer is regressed on the average
of the pendants’ initial answers.
Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix report the inﬂuence weights when estimating them
separately for each treatment. For instance, in the random treatment T0, a pendant’s ﬁnal
answer is estimated as the linear combination of its initial answer with weight 56.7%, the
center’s initial answer with weight 26.7%, and the other pendants’ average initial answer
with weight 16.6%. There are several interesting observations to make in these tables.
First, every agent places much weight to his own initial opinion. In the rational model
and the random treatment, we would expect that on average this weight is 25%.15 Second,
the weight individuals place on their own initial opinion depends on the treatment. In
the random treatment, pendants place more weight on themselves than in the other two,
while centers place less weight on themselves in the random treatment. Finally, the social
inﬂuence by the other team members heavily depends on the treatment. For pendants,
the center’s weight was 26.7% in the random treatment T0, but 46.9% in the conﬁdence
treatment T2; and similarly in the accuracy treatment T1.
The two aspects of a treatment, the trait of the center and the declaration of the center,
are then captured by the interaction eﬀects of the corresponding dummy variables with
the inﬂuence weights in the regressions that pool the three treatments. These regressions
are reported in Tables A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix. Their eﬀects are illustrated in
Figure 3. A positive eﬀect of a certain dummy variable means that the given inﬂuence
weight is increased by the given treatment.
When the center happens to be the most accurate or the most conﬁdent, but there is
no public declaration of this, then the pendants do not strongly respond (panel A); they
only mildly increase their weight on the center. In the same case, i.e., when the center
is the most accurate or conﬁdent, the center places signiﬁcantly more weight on her own
initial opinion and, accordingly, signiﬁcantly less weight on the pendants’ opinions (panel
B). In contrast, the declaration that the center is the most conﬁdent or accurate does
not aﬀect the center’s weighting (panel D), but there is a strong eﬀect on the pendants
(panel C). Declaring that the center is somehow special (the most conﬁdent or accurate
on a similar question) signiﬁcantly increases the pendants’ weights on the center’s initial
opinions.
15We will return to this observation when extending the social learning models in section 5.1.
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Figure 3: Trait and declaration inﬂuence for pendants and centers. Gray accuracy, black
conﬁdence treatments, 95 % conﬁdence intervals.
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Result 4. The pendants place more weight on a center who is declared to be the most
conﬁdent or the most accurate. The center places less weight on the pendants’ when she
is the most conﬁdent or the most accurate.
This result provides an explanation for the former results. Declaring that the center
is somewhat special increases the weight (s)he receives. Placing more weight to a single
opinion has a negative eﬀect on performance, except if this person is substantially better
informed than the others. In the accuracy treatment T1, this condition is satisﬁed to
some extent, such that the negative eﬀect of placing too much weight on a single person
and the positive eﬀect of placing more weight on a person who is better informed may
balance each other. Consequently, the performance in the accuracy treatment T1 need
not diﬀer from the random treatment T0. In the case of the conﬁdence treatment T2, the
center is not substantially better informed than the other group members, as can be seen
from panel C in Figure 1. Hence, giving him/her more weight only has the negative eﬀect
of insuﬃciently taking into account the information of the others. This is on average even
worse than the random treatment T0.
4.4 Overconﬁdence
As we have seen in Table 2 above, it is rather beneﬁcial for the group when the center
happens to be most accurate or most conﬁdent, but is not declared as such. On the
other hand, it is well-known that many people are often overconﬁdent, i.e., they report
much too small conﬁdence intervals when asked about a region where they expect the true
answer with a certain probability (a usual way is to ask where they expect the answer in
90% of their guesses; see, e.g., Soll and Klayman (2004); Moore and Healy (2008); Herz
et al. (2014). In phase I of our experiment, we asked participants to provide such regions.
Therefore, we can compute for every participant her individual overconﬁdence score simply
by counting how often that person provided a conﬁdence interval that did not contain
the true answer. Thus, every participant is characterized by an overconﬁdence score in
{0, 1, . . . , 8} with the interpretation that a person is the more overconﬁdent the larger
her overconﬁdence score becomes. As Figure 4 reveals, many agents are over-conﬁdent.
Their guess should only lie in 10% of the cases outside of their provided 90% conﬁdence
interval. However, for most agents this happens in more than two out of eight cases. The
histogram also documents that there is substantial heterogeneity in overconﬁdence.
In Table A.5 in the Appendix, we analyze how the center’s overconﬁdence score as
well as the sum of the pendants’ overconﬁdence scores impact the group’s performance
(on top of the previously found treatment eﬀects): we ﬁnd the corresponding regression
coeﬃcients to be signiﬁcantly positive for all three error measures (while the formerly
discussed eﬀects remain). Moreover, the center’s coeﬃcient is substantially larger than
the pendants’. We thus have the following result.
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Figure 4: Histogram of overconﬁdence. The value 0 means that a subject has speciﬁed for
all eight knowledge questions a respective 90% conﬁdence interval which encloses the true
value. The value 8 means that a subject has speciﬁed for all eight knowledge questions a
90% conﬁdence interval which does not enclose the true value. All values above 1 indicate
overprecision, since more than 10% of estimates fall out of the 90% conﬁdence interval
(i.e., 91.5% of subjects are over-conﬁdent).
Result 5. Both the center’s and the pendants’ overconﬁdence undermine performance.
The center’s overconﬁdence has a more deteriorating eﬀect than the pendants’ overconﬁ-
dence.
Given this result, it is, ceteris paribus, best for the group’s performance if the most
overconﬁdent group members are pendants, i.e., it would be best if the least overconﬁdent
group member was the center. On the other hand, overconﬁdence is of course strongly re-
lated to conﬁdence itself, and the most conﬁdent group member acting as center improves
the group’s performance when she is not declared to be the most conﬁdent. Indeed,
Table A.5 reveals that, when controlling for overconﬁdence and for the declaration of
conﬁdence, the trait of being the most conﬁdent signiﬁcantly increases performance.
Thus, we conclude that the leader personality who should optimally be selected is
characterized as conﬁdent without being overconﬁdent. Depending on the individual
characteristics, it can therefore be optimal to select someone who is not the most conﬁdent
agent, if the chosen agent can compensate by being very ‘tight’, i.e., not overconﬁdent.
Hence, all results (Results 1-5) contribute to a coherent picture of how the selection of
the leader aﬀects social learning. To investigate this interpretation further, in particular
the on of placing “too much weight on the center” in the conﬁdence treatment T2, we
analyze more in-depth the underlying micro-level mechanisms. In particular, we will study
the fact that weights on own opinions are too large, which also prevents optimal social
learning. As the social inﬂuence analysis showed, both pendants and centers generally
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placed much weight on their own initial opinion. When studying the learning behavior in
the next section, we will incorporate this behavioral aspect. Hence, all results (Results 1-
5) contribute to a coherent picture of how the selection of the leader aﬀects social learning.
To investigate this interpretation further, in particular the on of placing “too much weight
on the center” in the conﬁdence treatment T2, we analyze more in-depth the underlying
micro-level mechanisms. In particular, we will study the fact that weights on own opinions
are too large, which also prevents optimal social learning. As the social inﬂuence analysis
showed, both pendants and centers generally placed much weight on their own initial
opinion. When studying the learning behavior in the next section, we will incorporate
this behavioral aspect.
5 Learning Behavior
The experimental data admit testing theories of social learning on multiple levels. First,
their implications for the performance of social learning (as summarized in Prediction 1
and Prediction 2) are consistent with some empirical results and inconsistent with others.
Second, we can directly take the theoretical models to the data and study which aspects
are in line with real behavior. For this purpose, we specify and vary the models and
measure which model speciﬁcation best ﬁts the data. We thus include model variations
that incorporate conservatism, a pattern that is commonly found in experimental set-ups,
but absent in any Bayesian model of social learning (that we are aware of) and absent in
almost all na¨ıve models of social learning.
5.1 Speciﬁcation and Extension of Bayesian Models
To specify the rational models, we assume that each agent’s belief follows a beta distri-
bution. This is a standard functional form for beliefs that live on intervals.16 With some
assumptions on the distribution of signals, all agents’ beliefs at any time indeed belong
to the class of beta distributions.17 Assuming conditional independence of initial signals,
Bayesian agents will state guesses that are convex combinations of their initial guesses.
The weight on these guesses, however, depends on the signal quality of each agent i,
which we denote by ni. The model variations that we study diﬀer in the assumptions
about signal quality.
A baseline assumption is to suppose that the precision of each agent’s signal is the
same, i.e., ni = nj for all i, j. In that case, the optimal guess x
∗, which will be the
consensus from round t = 3 on, is simply the unweighted mean of the initial guesses xi(1).
16Like the normal distribution, which is a standard functional form for beliefs on the unbounded real
numbers, it is determined by two parameters only.
17The formal framework is provided in section B.2 of the Online Appendix.
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We call this the Standard Model. Alternatively, agents are assumed to communicate their
belief fully by providing the guess and the conﬁdence level. Then, for each answer xi(1)
and its conﬁdence ci(1), the center can determine the two parameters of the corresponding
beta distribution and combine all initial beliefs in a rational manner, thereby updating
leads to a combination of own and others’ guesses – not with equal weights, but with
larger weights for those guesses which are tagged by high conﬁdence. We call this the
Sophisticated Model. Note that these are two opposing views on the informativeness of the
conﬁdence statement – either conﬁdence is fully informative or conﬁdence can be ignored
– which lead to two models that both satisfy the requirements of Prediction 1, and are
hence similar in most respects. They diﬀer in their weighting of initial information.
The previous empirical literature on real people’s beliefs and their updating ﬁnds two
very strong and consistent patterns: overprecision and conservatism.18 There is a simple
way to introduce both of them into our model: Agents overestimate their own signal
precision by a factor τi ≥ 1; respectively, they underestimate the signal precision of the
others by the inverse factor 1
τi
. The motivation of this model variant is that overconﬁdent
agents suﬀer from overprecision in the sense that they perceive their signal as more precise
than it is.19
Formally, this is a generalization of the Standard Model and the Sophisticated Model.
This model also predicts that there are no more changes after t = 3. However, this model
does not predict consensus! The agents’ opinions settle down in between the prediction
of x∗ (i.e., the case τi = 1 for all i ∈ N) and their initial guess xi(1). The weight of the
own initial guess is thereby increasing in overprecision τi. In particular, if τi → ∞, then
xi(t) → xi(1), i.e., inﬁnitely overprecise agents are totally conservative and always stick
to their initial guess. (We will include such a model as a baseline and call it the Sticking
Model.)
To specify concrete models, we choose levels of overprecision τi that match with em-
pirical results on overprecision. When asked for a 90% conﬁdence interval, many people
provide a 50% conﬁdence interval instead. This is roughly induced by τi = 5. Incor-
porating conservatism of every agent into the Standard Model or, respectively, into the
Sophisticated Model leads to the two models Standard-Plus Model and Sophisticated-Plus
Model. In the Standard-Plus Model, agents behave very similarly to the Standard Model,
but move only a fraction into the direction of the center, which corresponds to ﬁndings on
18Overprecision, as it is called by Moore and Healy (2008), is also known as “judgmental overconﬁdence”
(Herz et al., 2014), “overconﬁdence in interval estimates” (Soll and Klayman, 2004), or “resoluteness”
(Bolton et al., 2013), and is deﬁned as “excessive certainty regarding the accuracy of one’s belief.”
Conservatism means that agents are not willing to learn suﬃciently from new signals (e.g., Peterson and
Beach (1967); Mobius et al. (2011); Ambuehl and Li (2014); Mannes and Moore (2013)). Of course, the
two patterns are closely related to each other.
19Or, alternatively: agents learn from their neighbors, but they attach higher uncertainty to the beliefs
of others than to their own belief.
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conservatism. The only diﬀerence to the Sophisticated-Plus Model is simply that we spec-
ify the initial signal precision not as equal, but according to the conﬁdence statements.
Agents are assumed to know that others are overprecise and thus learn about the original
signals by correcting for τ .20
Importantly, the four models Standard Model, Sophisticated Model, Standard-Plus
Model, and Sophisticated-Plus Model are all special cases of Bayesian models and hence
produce the prediction that is formalized as Prediction 1. Except that, in the Standard-
Plus Model and the Sophisticated-Plus Model, agents do not state the same guess x∗ from
round 3 on, but their subjectively perceived optimal guess x∗i , which is a mixture be-
tween x∗ and the agent’s initial guess xi(1). This diﬀerence is illustrated in Figure 5
below in the two left panels, which compare the dynamics of the Standard Model with
the Standard-Plus Model in a simple example.
5.2 Speciﬁcation and Extension of DeGroot models
In the DeGroot framework of na¨ıve learning, agents approach consensus. Consensus is
given by x(∞) = w′x(1), where the vector w captures the eigenvector centrality of the
agents (e.g., Friedkin (1991); DeMarzo et al. (2003); Golub and Jackson (2010)).
The most common speciﬁcation is to allocate equal weights to any connection including
to oneself.
G =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
2
1
2
0 0
1
2
0 1
2
0
1
2
0 0 1
2
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Credit for this speciﬁcation is usually given to DeMarzo et al. (2003). This behavior
corresponds to Bayesian updating with independent signals of equal precision in the ﬁrst
round, but not in later rounds. The long-term prediction using this DeMarzo et al. Model
is determined by w = (2
5
, 1
5
, 1
5
, 1
5
)′, i.e., pendants’ initial opinions enter the calculation of
the consensus with a weight of 20% each, while the center’s initial opinion accounts for
40% of the consensus.
Corazzini et al. (2012) suggest improving the DeMarzo et al. Model by increasing the
weight of agents who listen to many other agents (and show that this twist improves
the model ﬁt to experimental data). The suggested speciﬁcation is that the weights are
20In the conservatism models (consisting of the speciﬁcations Standard-Plus and Sophisticated-Plus),
we make assumptions about higher-order beliefs that close the model in the sense that no agent will
expect another agent to behave in a diﬀerent manner than in the one observed. In particular, we assume
that all agents think of all other agents as overprecise; and that all agents think that all agents think
that all agents are overprecise. In that way, an agent i is not surprised that j discounts i’s behavior from
i’s point of view (from a neutral point of view, j takes i’s behavior as he should) and that j overvalues
j’s guess (from i’s and a neutral standpoint).
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proportional to the outdegree (i.e., the number of agents listened to):
G =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
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This model predicts that the center of the star is even more inﬂuential in the long run:
w = ( 9
15
, 2
15
, 2
15
, 2
15
)′.21
Incorporating conservatism requires a model extension. Friedkin and Johnsen (1990)
provide a more general model of na¨ıve learning. Initial opinions are determined by some
exogenous conditions, which can always have an impact on an agent’s opinion. Such a
model has also been analyzed in Golub and Jackson (2012). To incorporate this aspect,
we can simply let agents stick to their initial guess xi(1) to some extent α:
xi(t) = (1− αi) ·Gx(t− 1) + αi · xi(1).
For αi = 0, we have the DeGroot model. For αi = 1, we have the simplest conceivable
model: an agent makes an initial guess xi(1) and then sticks to it. This is a baseline model
that we call the Sticking Model, as already mentioned when discussing totally overprecise
rational learners.
If αi ∈ (0, 1) for every agent i, then the model prediction is that agents move towards
the others’ guesses, but still rely on their initial guess. This is conservatism.22 Inter-
estingly, with this model variation, the updating process converges without reaching a
consensus (for generic starting values).
We extend the DeMarzo et al. Model and the Corazzini et al. Model by the Friedkin
and Johnsen (1990) framework and set the conservatism/overprecision parameter α = 0.5.
This leads to the DeMarzo et al. Plus Model and the Corazzini et al. Plus Model. In these
models, agents do not approach consensus anymore. For instance, in the DeMarzo et al.
Plus Model, the long-term guess of a pendant i is a convex combination of initial guesses
with the following weights: weight 2
9
on the center’s initial guess, weight 1
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on other
pendants’ initial guesses each, and weight 19
27
(≈ 70%) on the own initial guess, which
leads to diﬀerent guesses of each pendant. This diﬀerence is illustrated in the right panels
of Figure 5. The long-term weights of the Corazzini et al. Plus Model are comparable, but
21Grimm and Mengel (2016) propose another speciﬁcation of the DeGroot weights. However, their ex-
tension does not lead to an additional prediction here because weights depend on the clustering coeﬃcient,
which is zero for all agents in the star network.
22Interpretations for the cause of conservatism include forms of overprecision or kinds of anchoring
bias in which the initial guess serves as anchor and the adjustments to the others’ guesses is limited by
parameter α.
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Figure 5: Simple examples of dynamics. Upper panels illustrate two prominent models
from the literature; lower panels illustrate their extensions when conservatism is incorpo-
rated. Standard Model is upper left, Standard-Plus Model is lower left, DeMarzo et al.
Model is upper right, and DeMarzo et al. Plus Model is lower right panel. Hence the left
panels illustrate rational models, the right panels na¨ıve models.
diﬀer in that each agent, including the center, is more heavily inﬂuenced by the center’s
initial opinion.
Four models are illustrated in Figure 5. The most important diﬀerences are easily ob-
servable. In Bayesian models (left panels), learning stops in round 3; in na¨ıve models (right
panels), answers converge. In the speciﬁcations without conservatism/overprecision (up-
per panels), agents reach or converge to consensus; in the models with conservatism/overprecision
(lower panels), there is a persistent heterogeneity of answers, such that each agent’s answer
is “biased” towards the own initial answer. Note that the conservative/overprecise agents
in the na¨ıve models behave similarly to conservative/overprecise agents in the rational
learning approach.
5.3 Comparison of Models (Horse Race)
In total, we have speciﬁed nine models. Four following from the rational approach to
social learning, four following from the na¨ıve approach to social learning, and one baseline
model (the Sticking Model), which is a degenerate special case of both model classes. We
implemented each model such that all periods t ≥ 2 are p?icted from values at t = 1. We
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assess the ﬁt of each model by measuring the root of the mean squared error (RMSE)
between the model predictions for t ≥ 2 and the data points. Figure 6 displays the results.
The worst overall model ﬁt is obtained by the baseline model, in which all agents
stick to their initial guess (Sticking Model). The best model ﬁt is obtained by the “Plus”
models, which incorporate conservatism. In fact, every model considered has a larger
RMSE than its “Plus” counterpart that incorporates conservatism.
Considering the model ﬁt for each round separately, the conservatism aspect seems
particularly helpful in predicting the ﬁrst updates (round 2). Hence, the “Plus” models
ﬁt much better than the others in these early periods. However, in the last period, the
“Plus” models ﬁt best still, with the only exception that the DeMarzo et al. Model ﬁts
better than the Sophisticated-Plus Model. This observation indicates that the advantage
of the models that include conservatism is not restricted to the ﬁrst rounds, but resists.
Ignoring the “Plus” models for one moment, we can see that the na¨ıve learning in
the DeMarzo speciﬁcation ﬁts well to the data. The sophisticated speciﬁcation of the
rational model does not ﬁt to the data. The standard speciﬁcation of rational learning
and the Corazzini speciﬁcation of the na¨ıve learning are somewhere in between. Hence,
the straightforward speciﬁcations that treat all agents symmetrically (Standard Model,
DeMarzo et al. Model) are at least as adequate as the speciﬁcations that incorporate
conﬁdence statements in a speciﬁc way (Sophisticated Model), or that incorporate the
unequal degree (Corazzini et al. Model).
Adding conservatism to the models leads to a very good ﬁt of the rational model
in its standard speciﬁcation (Standard-Plus Model) and a better ﬁt of the sophisticated
speciﬁcation (Sophisticated-Plus Model) than without conservatism. The best model ﬁt
is obtained for the na¨ıve models with conservatism (Corazzini et al. Plus Model and
DeMarzo et al. Plus Model).
We can also diﬀerentiate the model ﬁt by treatment. The results are illustrated in
Figure A.1 in the Appendix. The best model ﬁt in the random treatment T0 is obtained
for both the DeMarzo et al. Plus Model and the Standard-Plus Model with an RMSE of
7.88. Hence, these extensions of straightforward speciﬁcations of the na¨ıve and the rational
approach best predict the experimental data in the baseline treatment. Comparisons are
similar across treatments. However, the Corazzini et al. Model ﬁts better in the accuracy
T1 and conﬁdence treatment T2 than in the random treatment T0. The reason is that the
center receives a high inﬂuence weight in the accuracy and conﬁdence treatment T2, as
well as in the Corazzini et al. Model speciﬁcation. Complementarily, the baseline model
of sticking to the initial guess ﬁts much better in the random treatment T0 than in the
others. This is a clear indication that social inﬂuence is weakest in the random treatment
T0 and stronger in the accuracy treatment T1 and the conﬁdence treatment T2. Given
that social inﬂuence can undermine the wisdom of crowds (Lorenz et al., 2011), this is an
explanation for our result that the crowd error is lowest under the random leader T0.
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Figure 6: Root mean squared errors (RMSE) of social learning models. “Standard” and
“Sophisticated” are models of rational learning; “DeMarzo” and “Corazzini” are models
of na¨ıve learning. “Plus” models incorporate conservatism. Lower errors mean better ﬁt
between model and data.
We ﬁnally diﬀerentiate between the model ﬁt for the center and for the pendants.
The result is displayed in Figure A.2 in the Appendix. The Corazzini et al. Model, which
predicts an immense inﬂuence of the center, ﬁts well for the center, but not for the
pendants. Again, the “Plus” models ﬁt well generally for both pendants and centers. The
best ﬁt for the pendants is attained by the Corazzini et al. Plus Model, and the best ﬁt
for the center is attained by the Standard-Plus Model.
Result 6. Incorporating “conservatism” into both the rational and na¨ıve models of social
learning increases the ﬁt between theoretical models and empirical data.
The result holds for all four considered models, for all three treatments, for all rounds,
and, apart from one exception, for both centers and pendants. The exception is that the
Corazzini et al. Model predicts the center’s opinion better than the Corazzini et al. Plus
Model. Hence, our data strongly indicate that the extension of both the rational and the
na¨ıve models of social learning by conservatism is not a mere theoretical exercise, but an
empirically relevant generalization.
In sum, the results of the horse race show, ﬁrst of all, that both models of rational and
models of na¨ıve learning can contribute to our understanding of social learning in teams.
Second, the baseline model that each agent sticks to his own initial guess and keeps his
independent opinion ﬁts much better to the data when the team leader was selected at
random. Complementarily, models that predict an immense weight of the team leader’s
opinion (Corazzini et al. Model) ﬁt well when the leader is known to be the most conﬁdent
(T2) or most accurate (T1).
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Finally, the known models of social learning might fall short of covering the substantial
amount of conservatism that is characteristic for the social learning of real people. As-
suming that people are overprecise provides a foundation for conservative learning, even
for rational learners, and aﬀects the model prediction such that they are much closer to
our data. We can connect this observation with Result 5 that overconﬁdent leaders under-
mine social learning. Assuming that agents are overprecise induces conservative learning
in which the opinions of others are not suﬃciently accounted for. Therefore, overconﬁdent
leaders undermine performance.
6 Discussion
6.1 Summary and Conclusions
An organization’s ﬁt to the environment depends on the management’s ability to assess the
state of the – usually dynamic – environment and to cope with uncertainty. We measure
team performance in this respect by assessing its ability to estimate correct answers to
factual questions.
Having a team leader who is knowledgeable or conﬁdent in a given topic might in
principle be helpful. However, communicating the leader’s qualities can undermine this
eﬀect. Stressing the expertise or conﬁdence of the leader triggers other team members
to put too much weight on the leaders’ opinion. This narrows the opinion space and
diminishes the wisdom of the group substantially. Past accuracy (T1) and actual ability
are correlated such that there is a positive eﬀect of an accurate leader, which, however,
is immediately undermined by the eﬀect of declaring it. Conﬁdence (T2) is only weakly
correlated with actual ability such that the net eﬀect is signiﬁcantly negative.
In addition to a negative eﬀect of declaring the selection criteria of leaders, we can show
that most people are overconﬁdent in their estimates and in their assessments of problems.
Overconﬁdence leads to ignorance of the others’ valuable opinions, information gets lost,
and the team’s potential for solving problems deteriorates. While overconﬁdence of every
team member has a deteriorating eﬀect, the leader’s overconﬁdence has the strongest
negative eﬀect.
These are two detrimental eﬀects of leaders selected by conﬁdence. We can further
show the micro-mechanisms of these detrimental eﬀects by simulating diﬀerent classes
of learning models. In particular, rational learning models in which social learning is
eﬃcient, independent of the team leader, fall short of explaining our data. A better ﬁt is
obtained for na¨ıve learning models that predict that the leader is more inﬂuential than any
other team member. Among those, the model that gives tremendous weight to the leader
(Corazzini et al. Model) does not ﬁt well in the random treatment T0, but particularly well
in the treatments T1 and T2, in which the leader is not selected at random. Compared to
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all models, people tend to adapt too little to the others’ opinions and are too conﬁdent in
their own subjective estimates. To introduce this pattern in the theory of social learning,
we extend both rational and na¨ıve models by conservatism, which can be derived from
overconﬁdence. With this twist, the ﬁt of each model to the data increases substantially.
Moreover, this kind of bounded rationality leads to the fact that leaders learn too little
from the opinions in their network.
One conclusion from our paper is that we provide evidence for the superiority of a se-
lection procedure that is based on random leader selection (“sortition”). This mechanism
has its roots in ancient Greece and has been discussed by various names such as “de-
marchy” or “aleatory democracy” (Zeitoun et al., 2014; Frey and Osterloh, 2016). While
there have been discussions in the literature about the advantages and disadvantages of
aleatory democracy, there is hardly empirical evidence. Our empirical results demon-
strate that random selection can be beneﬁcial compared to selection based on conﬁdence.
Selection by conﬁdence often leads to detrimental eﬀects of truth-ﬁnding, since ﬁrst the
leader listens too little to other members of the group and second the other members
listen too much to the leader. Our experiment is one of the ﬁrst to shed light on one of
the potential mechanisms of why aleatory democracy may be beneﬁcial. The strength of
random selection is not restricted to reducing the probability of overconﬁdent leaders. It
is also based on the fact that the leader’s inﬂuence on team members is not ampliﬁed and,
therefore, the others’ opinions are respected more compared to a system in which leaders
push their own views on all team members due to both a central position in the commu-
nication network and an additional legitimacy because they are selected by expertise, or
even worse, by conﬁdence.
The problem of overconﬁdence of leaders and its detrimental eﬀects on group wisdom
becomes even more important when considering that expertise is often hard to measure in
reality. In fact, publicly expressed subjective conﬁdence in the own expertise might some-
times be more important for becoming a leader than objective expertise. The problem is
that the truth is often not precisely known. Therefore, publicly expressed conﬁdence may
persuade others that the person in question may know the correct answers. However, as
our experiment shows, when conﬁdence and expertise are not strongly correlated, overly
conﬁdent leaders can mislead the group. This diﬃculty in assessing the true expertise for
selecting leaders may therefore be another argument for the beneﬁcial empirical eﬀects of
aleatory democracy, where the leaders are selected at random.
In our experiment, we focus on the team’s ability to converge to correct assessments of
the environment, which is to adapt and learn from each other such that they ﬁnd correct
answers to factual questions. However, in addition to correct problem-solving, another
goal of teams is to foster cohesion, e.g., to strengthen their corporate identity. Sometimes,
it is less important to ﬁnd the truth, but more important to converge towards a common
opinion. Having a common opinion helps to reduce conﬂicts, work on the same tasks, and
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help each other. This means that opinion convergence can be a separate, distinct goal of
teams and those leaders may be preferable who manage to unify the opinion space in their
team. Our experiment only focuses on the goal of ﬁnding correct answers. How to foster
coordination, opinion convergence, and cohesion is another goal. For example, it has been
shown that a leader’s overconﬁdence or resoluteness can foster coordination and cohesion
(Bolton et al., 2013). In their theoretical contribution, Bolton et al. (2013) already point
to the trade-oﬀ that an overconﬁdent leader, while having positive eﬀects for coordination,
has the downside of not suﬃciently learning from the followers. We can now strengthen
and empirically document the second mechanism: overconﬁdence of leaders is clearly a
detrimental factor to the team’s learning. Hence, the strength of overconﬁdent leaders
for coordination comes at the downside of suboptimal information-processing. When it
comes to tasks which are related to truth-ﬁnding, we claim that overconﬁdent (or resolute)
leaders are actually harmful.
6.2 Limitations
The strength of our experimental design comes at the expense of certain limitations. First,
the external validity of this type of experiments depends on whether the interaction among
participants (who were virtually all university students) are similar to the interaction
among members of real teams in organizations. Moreover, we focus on the organizational
task to estimate the state of the environment, while other aspects also matter for the
performance of an organization. At the same time, this is a strength of our experimental
set-up, since we can isolate the performance in a key task: estimating the state of the
environment.
We have exogenously varied the selection criterion of the leader. This takes the per-
spective of the top management, deciding about, e.g., the promotion criteria of more and
less senior employees of the organization. It would also be interesting to see how team
members themselves would choose a selection criterion if they were given the opportunity
to choose.
By studying star networks, we have not varied the network architecture, but only the
network positions, which for star networks boils down to the question of who is the leader.
Follow-up research might include a variety of network architectures. This is beyond the
scope of this paper because it would shift the emphasis from the selection of the team
leader to the selection of a communication architecture within an organization. Formal
hierarchies within organizations usually have a star-like structure, e.g., they determine
the head of an organizational unit, or the president of a certain committee, which can be
directly modeled by star networks. However, since informal networks within organizations
are also known to be important, alternative network architectures and even endogenous
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network formation should be considered in future research.23
Finding that overconﬁdence is an important determinant of social learning suggests an
alternative treatment that combines accuracy and conﬁdence to overconﬁdence, in which
leaders are selected based on their relatively low or high level of overconﬁdence. This
seems an interesting extension that, however, does not match real selection procedures we
are aware of. This could be considered an innovative suggestion to assess overconﬁdence
when selecting managers. Our treatments T1 accuracy and T2 conﬁdence resemble real
selection criteria based on maximal competence, which are either objectively assessed (T1
accuracy) or subjectively provided by self-declaration (T2 conﬁdence).
Finally, our experimental design focuses on social learning and does not mix it with
the decision-making process. After learning took place in a team, there are various forms
of how a decision is actually made. It could be the case that the team communicates its
opinions to the higher level management or their client, who then draw their conclusions
and take actions. It could also be that the team takes actions on its own, deciding, e.g.,
by the majority rule or with unanimity about the consequences. Obviously, decision-
making processes also aﬀect the quality of the decisions and are thus important to study.
However, studying them jointly with the social learning process can distort the measures
of learning since communication before collective decisions makes strategic considerations
in the communication stage prevalent.
6.3 Practical implications
Our ﬁndings suggest several practical implications. First, when selecting a leader, there
is a substantial diﬀerence between assessing a candidate’s competence by some tests (as
in our accuracy treatment T1) versus relying on her subjective statement of her own com-
petence (as in our conﬁdence treatment T2). This even holds when there are no strategic
incentives to misrepresent the own opinion and the own competence. Our ﬁndings clearly
suggest, whenever possible, focusing on objective measures of competence rather than
trusting subjectively stated conﬁdence in candidates’ own expertise. A large majority of
people is over-conﬁdent, such that starting a competition as to who is claiming the highest
conﬁdence will most likely lead to detrimental eﬀects in selecting leaders who will listen
too little to other opinions in their network. Hence, when the main goal of the team is
related to truth-ﬁnding, this is expected to be a poor selection criterion.
Second, the way the selection criterion for the leader is communicated to a team heavily
aﬀects the team’s interaction and performance. In particular, making explicit that the
team leader was selected at random can lead other team members to make use of their
own valuable knowledge instead of “blindly” following their leader. By the hierarchical
23In a quite diﬀerent framework, endogenous network structures and social learing in organizations
have been studied by C¸elen and Hyndman (2012).
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structure, which determines the communication network, the team leader is already very
powerful and her opinion is certainly heard. Declaring that the team leader was selected
because of her (alleged) superiority increases her power, which might push team learning
out of balance. Hence, keeping quiet about the (alleged) superiority of a team leader can
foster more eﬃcient learning within a team.
Third, we can validate that communication and social inﬂuence can be harmful for
the wisdom of crowds eﬀect (Lorenz et al., 2011). We conﬁrm this ﬁnding for unequal
communication structures in terms of star networks, where all people are connected to
a single center, who receives all information from the network while the others have to
communicate via the center. In particular, we show that the wisdom of crowd error
increases over time, giving evidence that the group can exploit less and less information
from other network members over consecutive periods of social inﬂuence. However, and
importantly, we also show that social inﬂuence can foster social learning. In particular,
the individual error and the collective error improve over time. Crucially, the eﬀect of
social inﬂuence on performance is moderated by the selection criterion of who is in the
powerful position in the communication network, and by the declaration of the selection
criterion. In conclusion, if teams want to utilize the wisdom of crowds within their team,
they should admit interaction and opinion exchange, but prevent single individuals from
becoming overly inﬂuential.
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A Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures
(1) (2) (3)
T0 random: answer 6 T1 accuracy: answer 6 T2 conﬁdence: answer 6
own weight (pendant) 0.567∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗
(13.70) (9.35) (7.87)
center’s weight 0.267∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗
(8.82) (12.72) (14.13)
other pendants’ weight 0.166∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗
(5.95) (3.78) (3.14)
N 528 264 264
t statistics in parentheses
robust s.e. clustered subjects
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.1: Inﬂuence weights on pendants’ ﬁnal answer, separately estimated for each
treatment. Regression of the pendant’s ﬁnal answer (period 6) on the initial answers
(period 1). Coeﬃcients forced to sum up to one.
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Figure A.1: Root mean squared errors (RMSE) of social learning models diﬀerentiated
by treatment. Lower errors mean better ﬁt between model and data.
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(1) (2) (3)
T0 random: answer 6 T1 accuracy: answer 6 T2 conﬁdence: answer 6
own weight (center) 0.473∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗∗
(8.80) (9.91) (10.68)
pendants’ weight 0.527∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗
(9.79) (5.13) (4.47)
N 176 88 88
t statistics in parentheses
robust s.e. clustered for 176 subjects
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.2: Inﬂuence weights on center’s ﬁnal answer, separately estimated for each treat-
ment. Regression of the center’s ﬁnal answer (period 6) on the initial answers (period 1).
Coeﬃcients forced to sum up to one.
8.62 8.15 8.93 9.24
10.06
11.44
10.06
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9.36
9.08
8.22 10.59
11.26 11.06
DeMarzoPlus CorazziniPlus StandardPlus DeMarzo SophisticatedPlus Corazzini Standard Sophisticated Sticking
RMSEbyCenter
Pendants Center
Figure A.2: Root mean squared errors (RMSE) of diﬀerent models by center and pendants
diﬀerentiated by center and pendants. Lower errors mean better ﬁt between model and
data.
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(1)
pendant’s answer 6 (last period)
own weight (pendant) 0.577∗∗∗
(12.05)
center weight 0.244∗∗∗
(6.81)
other pendants weight 0.198∗∗∗
(5.31)
accuracy-trait × own -0.0234
(-0.41)
accuracy-trait × center 0.0693
(1.69)
accuracy-trait × other pendants -0.0393
(-0.90)
accuracy-declaration (T1) × own -0.140
(-1.90)
accuracy-declaration (T1) × center 0.120∗
(2.33)
accuracy-declaration (T1) × other pendants 0.0222
(0.40)
conﬁdence-trait × own -0.00712
(-0.14)
conﬁdence-trait × center 0.0317
(0.79)
conﬁdence-trait × other pendants -0.0516
(-1.15)
conﬁdence-declaration (T2) × own -0.152∗
(-2.37)
conﬁdence-declaration (T2) × center 0.169∗∗∗
(3.39)
conﬁdence-declaration (T2) × other pendants 0.0407
(0.80)
N 1.056
t statistics in parentheses
robust s.e. clustered for 176 subjects
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.3: Inﬂuence weights on pendant’s ﬁnal answer. Linear regression of the pendant’s
ﬁnal answer (period 6) on the initial answers (period 1).
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(1)
center’s answer 6 (last period)
own weight (center) 0.400∗∗∗
(6.23)
pendants weight 0.643∗∗∗
(9.76)
accuracy-trait × own 0.158∗
(2.45)
accuracy-trait pendants -0.147∗
(-2.09)
accuracy-declaration (T1) × own 0.0402
(0.44)
accuracy-declaration (T1) × pendants -0.0393
(-0.38)
conﬁdence-trait × own 0.139∗
(2.05)
conﬁdence-trait × pendants -0.189∗∗
(-2.70)
conﬁdence-declaration (T2) × own 0.108
(1.44)
conﬁdence-declaration (T2) × pendants -0.0353
(-0.42)
N 352
t statistics in parentheses
robust s.e. clustered for 176 subjects
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.4: Inﬂuence weights on center’s ﬁnal answer. Linear regression of the center’s
ﬁnal answer (period 6) on the initial answers (period 1)
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(1) (2) (3)
individual error (log) collective error (log) crowd error
accuracy-trait -0.0989 -0.0589 0.0143
(-1.70) (-0.62) (0.05)
accuracy-declaration (T1) 0.108 0.0709 0.185
(1.56) (0.56) (0.55)
conﬁdence-trait -0.136∗ -0.264∗ -0.695∗
(-2.23) (-2.37) (-2.38)
conﬁdence-declaration (T2) 0.238∗∗∗ 0.355∗ 1.215∗∗
(3.36) (2.65) (2.93)
overprecision center 0.0426∗∗ 0.0453∗ 0.216∗∗∗
(2.76) (2.05) (3.32)
overprecision pendants (sum) 0.0268∗∗ 0.0268 0.102
(3.04) (1.83) (1.92)
intercept 1.696∗∗∗ 1.706∗∗∗
(10.84) (7.43)
intercept cut 1 -0.637
(-0.70)
intercept cut 1 1.154
(1.33)
N 1.408 352 352
t statistics in parentheses
Question dummy coeﬃcients not shown
Individual error: robust s.e. clustered for 176 subjects
Collective and crowd errors: robust s.e. clustered for 44 groups
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.5: Treatment eﬀects on ﬁnal errors: log error, log collective error and wisdom of
crowd error (in period 6). Linear regression (models 1 and 2) and ordered logit regression
(model 3).
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on self-confidence. The reason is that random leaders are better able to use the knowledge 
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communication network already makes a leader highly influential. Knowing that the leader is not 
selected at random pushes team members to weigh the leader’s opinion even more. We set up a 
horse race between several rational and naïve models of social learning to investigate the micro-
level mechanisms. We find that overconfidence and conservatism contribute to the fact that too 
confident leaders mislead their team in finding good estimates.
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